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Two main options have been put on the table for (re-)accommodating an
independent Scotland in the European Union: accession of an independent Scotland
to the European Union by means of the procedure of accession of new member
states set out in Article 49 TEU; or accommodation of Scotland as a new member
state at the same time as it achieves independence, by means of a revision of the
European Treaties according to Article 48 TEU. The latter option is supported by the
Scottish government in its Scotland’s Future White Paper of November 2013. The
Treaty revision would enter into force at the same time as Scotland would become
independent (and the government suggested a date for this to happen, namely 24
March 2016). In this way, there would be a seamless transition. Scotland would not
first drop out of the EU by separating from the UK, and later climb in again through
an accession treaty; it would simply stay inside the EU all the time.
I agree with Sionaidh Douglas-Scott that this approach is more attractive. Indeed,
EU law currently applies on Scottish territory, and both British and EU nationals living
on Scottish territory are currently EU citizens, and benefit from the rights attached
to that status. Nobody really wants this to change. It would therefore be awkward
and costly, both for Scotland and for the rest of Europe, if EU law would cease
to apply to Scotland upon its independence, and would have to be restored later,
after an accession treaty had entered into force. Indeed, such a temporal gap is
logically inherent in taking the accession route: a state can only request membership
of the EU after it has become independent. In his contribution to this discussion,
Joseph Weiler suggests that accession could be as seamless as revision: the act
of independence could be followed, the next minute, by signature of the accession
treaty with Scotland, so that Scotland could join the EU on the same day as it
becomes an independent state. But, even if an accession treaty could be signed
on the same day as Scotland becomes independent, it would then still have to be
ratified by all (then 29) member states before it could enter into force. It is hard to
imagine that all national parliaments would be able or willing to do so ‘on the spot’
and without any debate. A revision treaty, on the other hand, could be adopted by
the existing member state governments and ratified by their parliaments before
Scotland became independent, thus indeed allowing for a seamless transition of
legal rights and obligations.
The main logical argument against the Article 48-route is that the TEU provides, in
its Article 49, a special procedure for states to join the EU which could be taken to
mean that other routes to membership are not available. I do not find that argument
very persuasive, though. The norm of Article 49 is clearly written with a view
to states that, being outside the EU, would like to join it. Yet, a revision treaty
accommodating Scottish membership would be agreed before Scotland would be an
outside state, and therefore before Article 49 would become applicable. It would not
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deal with accession of a new member states, but rather with the creation of a new
member state by disaggregation of one of the current member states.
If a revision treaty would allow for a seamless transition, that would not make it a
  smooth transition, as Jo Murkens rightly points out in his contribution. A revision
treaty requires unanimous agreement and ratification by all member states,
and is therefore politically as difficult to achieve as accession. It has the added
difficulty that the negotiations would, formally at least, have to be conducted by
the UK government on behalf of the future independent Scotland.  The Scottish
government would itself not be represented at the negotiation table, and the
Scottish parliament would not be called to ratify the result of the negotiations.
Presumably, representatives of the Scottish government would be co-opted into the
UK delegation, but it is quite clear that the Scottish government could not insist on
the adoption of amendments that would not correspond to the rest-UK’s interest.
A typical example of this is the Scottish government’s demand for derogation from
the principle of equal access to higher education for EU students. The Scottish
government would like to retain higher tuition fees for English students.This unequal
treatment is fine under current EU law (since it is considered to be an internal UK
matter, not affecting the rights of mobile EU citizens), but would most probably be
unlawful once the rest-UK and Scotland become separate states. It would therefore
require an explicit Treaty-level derogation, but there is little prospect – it would seem
– of the UK government taking on board this request in the context of Treaty revision
negotiations.
The accommodation of an independent Scotland, by either the Article 48 or the
Article 49 route, would require a decision as to whether the numerous opt-outs
currently applying to the United Kingdom (EMU, Schengen, immigration, criminal
law) would continue to apply to Scotland. If there were no unanimous agreement
among all current member states to modify the Treaty protocols in which those opt-
outs are laid down, they would continue to apply to the ‘rest-United Kingdom’ and
would not apply to Scotland, since Scotland would have ceased to be part of the
UK. This means that the Scottish government, in case of a Yes vote, should prepare
itself for the likely possibility that membership of the EU would mean full membership
without any opt-outs, and therefore also membership of the Eurozone.
‘Seamless transition’ would, however, require much more than the successful
accomplishment of the treaty amendment process. It would also require the
adaptation of existing EU secondary law prior to the date of independence. Indeed,
there are many pieces of EU legislation that contain provisions applicable to some
member states in specific ways, and the position of Scotland would have to be
determined by means of amendments to that legislation that would have to enter into
force on the same day as the revision treaty, in order to allow for seamless transition
on independence day. This would apply, for example, to all EU legislation in the Area
of Freedom, Security and Justice for which the UK made use of its case-by-case
opt-out.  The exclusion of the UK from their field of application would not include
the future independent Scotland, so that the relevant directives, regulations and
decisions would have to be modified if Scotland wants to preserve the existing opt-
outs. But there are many country-specific norms in other areas of EU law as well. For
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example, the Directive on professional recognition of diplomas contains numerous
country-specific norms and lists in its main text and its Annexes.
In addition to changes of EU law, the Scottish government and parliament would also
have to enact new laws to accommodate their EU law obligations: for example, they
would have to define the criteria for Scottish citizenship; they would have to define
the ‘competent authority’ or ‘contact point’ which EU law requires in many areas
(for example, in the services directive, for recognition of diplomas, data protection,
competition law and the regulation of utilities). Scotland would also have to decide
on its representatives in the myriad member-state composed working groups and
committees in Brussels. One wonders how all this could be accomplished under the
Scottish parliament’s current, pre-independence, powers! Presumably, this would
require an informal pre-independence legislative process, whose results would have
to be approved in toto by the Scottish parliament on the first day of independence/
EU membership.
By way of conclusion, I would argue that, whereas the Article 48 route has major
advantages over the Article 49 route, and would be feasible – in my view at least –
as a matter of legal principle, it would create many complications all the same, both
for the Scots and for the rest of Europe.
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